IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

DAMIEN PARHAM,	
Plaintiff,) CIVIL ACTION NO. 0:05-2282-HFF-BM)
v. JOHN HICKEY,	REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Defendant.	
Defendant.)

This action has been filed by the Plaintiff, <u>pro se</u>, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, who was a pretrial detainee at the Aiken County Detention Center at the time this action was filed, alleges violations of his constitutional rights by the named Defendant.

On January 3, 2006 the undersigned issued an order instructing the parties that they had twenty (20) days in which to file dispositive motions, if any. See Order filed January 3, 2006. However, Plaintiff's copy of the Court's order was returned to the Clerk of Court on January 9, 2006, with the envelope being marked "RTS" (return to sender).

The Court notes that when Plaintiff filed this action, he was specifically instructed as follows:

You are ordered to always keep the Clerk of Court advised <u>in writing...</u>if your address changes for any reason, so as to assure that orders or other matters that specify deadlines for you to meet will be received by you. If as a result of your failure to comply with this order, you fail to file something you are required to file within a deadline set by a District Judge or a Magistrate Judge, <u>your case may be dismissed for violating this order</u>. Therefore, if you have a change of address



before this case has ended, you must comply with this order by immediately advising the Clerk of Court in writing of such change of address....Your failure to do so will not be excused by the Court. (emphasis added)

See Order filed August 25, 2005.

Plaintiff has apparently failed to comply with this order since his mail has now been returned, and as a result neither the Court nor the Defendant have any means of contacting him concerning his case.

Based on the foregoing, and the previous instructions and specific warning given to the Plaintiff in the Court's order of August 25, 2005, it is recommended that this action be **dismissed**, **with prejudice**, in accordance with Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., subject to the instructions hereinbelow. The Clerk is directed to send this Report and Recommendation to Plaintiff at his last known address.

If the Plaintiff notifies the Court within the time set forth for filing objections to this Report and Recommendation that he wishes to continue with this case and provides a current address, the Clerk is directed to vacate this Report and Recommendation and return this file to the undersigned for further handling. If, however, no objections are filed, the Clerk shall forward this Report and Recommendation to the District Judge for disposition.

The parties are also referred to the Notice Page attached hereto.

Bristow Marchant

United States Magistrate Judge

Columbia, South Carolina

January 12, 2006



Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation

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The Serious Consequences of a Failure to Do So

The parties are hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or Order and Recommendation) must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of its filing. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Based thereon, this Report and Recommendation, any objections thereto, and the case file will be delivered to a United States District Judge fourteen (14) days after this Report and Recommendation is filed. Advance Coating Technology, Inc. v. LEP Chemical, Ltd., 142 F.R.D. 91, 94 & n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.S.C. 1993).

During the ten-day period, <u>but not thereafter</u>, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. Any written objections must *specifically identify* the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made *and* the basis for such objections. Failure to file written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See <u>United States v. Schronce</u>, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, Schronce v. <u>United States</u>, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and <u>Wright v. Collins</u>, 766 F.2d 841, 845-47 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation to which he did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. <u>Howard v. Secretary of HHS</u>, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509 (6th Cir. 1991). See also <u>Praylow v. Martin</u>, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In <u>Howard</u>, <u>supra</u>, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are *not* sufficient:

A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. *** This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. *** We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.

Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-19 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded *pro se* in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:

Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. * * * A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.

See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 1989) ("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a pro se litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd. Cir. 1984) ("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger de novo review"). This notice, hereby, apprises the parties of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See Wright, supra,; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing addressed as follows:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201

